The Nash Folk Theorems are a collection of related results that characterise the Nash equilibria that can be sustained in repeated games. As the name suggests, the Folk Theorems are technically simple, but this simplicity belies the fact that they are of enormous significance. For example, it has been argued that they provide answers to fundamental questions relating to the structure and behaviour of human societies. In this talk, I will introduce the Folk Theorems, and then show how they can be applied in the context of multi-agent systems, to understand the equilibria that can be obtained in such systems.
I am a Professor of Computer Science in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Oxford, and a Senior Research Fellow at Hertford College. I joined Oxford on 1 June 2012; before this I was for twelve years a Professor of Computer Science at the University of Liverpool. In October 2011, I was awarded a 5-year ERC Advanced Grant, entitled "Reasoning About Computational Economies" (RACE). I am a AAAI Fellow, an ECCAI Fellow, an AISB Fellow, and a BCS Fellow. In 2006, I was the recipient of the ACM Autonomous Agents Research Award. In 1997, I founded AgentLink, the EC-funded European Network of Excellence in the area of agent-based computing. I was program chair for the 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI-2010), held in Lisbon, Portugal, in August 2010. I will be General Chair for the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2015), to be held in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Between 2003 and 2009 I was co-editor-in-chief of the Journal Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. I am an associate editor of the Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR) (2006-2009, 2009-2012), an associate editor of Artificial Intelligence journal (2009-2012) and serve on the editorial boards of the Journal of Applied Logic, Journal of Logic and Computation, Journal of Applied Artificial Intelligence, and Computational Intelligence.
Ana Maria Severino de Almeida e Paiva